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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Hovenkamp has made important and insightful contributions 
to the literature on antitrust federalism, antitrust history, and the influence of 
evolving theories of political economy on antitrust doctrine and constitutional 
law. This Essay builds upon these contributions, particularly as they relate to 
the appropriate federal antitrust response to state regulation that 
unreasonably restrains interstate commerce. Under modern constitutional 
law, states may restrain interstate commerce by imposing restrictions on price 
or banning reasonable, wealth-creating restraints. Congress could preempt 
such restraints, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Sherman 
Act does not nullify such legislative interference with free competition. The 
Court has justified these results by invoking considerations of “federalism” 
and “state sovereignty.” Thus, the Court has imputed to Congress a refusal to 
exercise the full scope of its commerce power out of deference to state 
regulatory prerogatives. 
 
             Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor, William and Mary Law School. 
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As Professor Hovenkamp has explained, however, such congressional 
intent is entirely fictional. During the 1890s, the constitutional regime of 
“dual federalism” enforced by judicial interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause prevented the overlap between federal and state regulation that makes 
preemption possible. This Essay elaborates upon this (correct) conclusion, 
clarifying the nature of dual federalism during antitrust’s formative era. The 
Essay also suggests that due process protection for liberty of contract 
prevented states from banning reasonable private restraints of intrastate 
commerce, restraints that facilitated the operation of interstate markets. The 
Congress that passed the Sherman Act would have assumed that states had no 
authority to regulate commerce subject to the Sherman Act or reasonable 
intrastate restraints beyond the scope of Congress’s power. 
Of course, the constitutional framework in place during antitrust’s 
formative era collapsed in 1937, when the Supreme Court abandoned liberty 
of contract and ceased placing meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce 
power. At the same time (and this is less well-known), the Court “unshackled” 
the states, weakening the Dormant Commerce Clause and allowing states to 
impose restraints on interstate commerce that pre-1937 case law would have 
condemned. 
The simultaneous expansion of Congress’s commerce power and 
relaxation of Dormant Commerce Clause standards created overlapping 
regulatory authority and thus opened the door to Sherman Act preemption 
of state restraints. Professor Hovenkamp has signaled openness to such 
preemption, at least where state restraints produce interstate spillovers. This 
Essay briefly reviews the strong case for such preemption as well as the 
counterarguments against it. The Essay also offers an alternative approach 
that would void restraints that produce meaningful spillovers, avoid Sherman 
Act preemption of much state law, and eliminate much of the overlap between 
state and federal jurisdiction that gives rise to the federalism concerns that 
preemption opponents invoke. 
Part II of this Essay reviews modern doctrines governing the Sherman 
Act’s treatment of state-imposed restraints. Part III discusses the constitutional 
landscape that Congress faced when it passed the Sherman Act in 1890, 
particularly dual federalism and liberty of contract. This Part also examines 
how these principles informed antitrust doctrine during antitrust’s formative 
era. Part IV details the collapse of this constitutional regime during the 1930s. 
Part V frames the interpretive questions posed by this collapse and articulates 
the competing arguments for and against Sherman Act preemption. This Part 
then offers an alternative approach that would nullify state restraints that 
produce significant spillovers, while minimizing federalism concerns. 
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II. THE STATUS OF STATE-IMPOSED RESTRAINTS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
The Sherman Act forbids contracts and other arrangements that 
unreasonably restrain “trade or commerce among the several [s]tates.”1 The 
classic example is a railroad cartel that charges non-competitive rates for the 
interstate transportation of goods or passengers.2 What, though, if states 
themselves interfere with free competition and restrain trade? Such 
interference can take three forms. First, states can authorize private parties to 
engage in anticompetitive conduct themselves by, for example, legalizing 
horizontal price fixing or mergers that result in monopoly.3 Second, states can 
compel private parties to restrain trade, by, for instance, requiring firms to 
charge prices above the competitive level. Third, states can ban conduct 
within interstate commerce that federal courts have previously determined to 
be reasonable and thus lawful under the Sherman Act. A contemporary 
example of this third category is state bans on minimum resale-price 
maintenance (“rpm”), despite the Supreme Court’s holding that the practice 
often creates wealth and is analyzed under the Rule of Reason.4 
The Sherman Act condemns restraints in the first category, despite 
ostensible state approval, unless the state “actively supervises” the resulting 
prices or other conduct.5 In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court evaluated the 
second type of restraint: California’s coercive restriction on farmers’ raisin 
output.6 Over 90% of the state’s raisin crop was exported from the state, and 
a private cartel producing the same result would have violated the Sherman 
Act.7 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Sherman 
Act does not preempt such legislation, rejecting the contrary argument by the 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
 3. Cf. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332–33 (1904) (rejecting an argument 
that state-law validity of a merger immunized a transaction from Sherman Act attack). 
 4. Compare Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–92, 899 
(2007) (rejecting a per se rule banning minimum rpm because the practice often produces 
competitive benefits), with California v. Bioelements, Inc., No. 10011659 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 
2011), available at http://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/n2028_bioelements 
_final_judgment.pdf (issuing a consent decree banning minimum rpm under state law). State statutes 
authorizing indirect purchaser suits to enforce state antitrust laws provide another example. See 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 817 
(4th ed. 2010) (characterizing these statutes as “[t]he most difficult preemption challenge facing 
state antitrust in recent years”). 
 5. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (condemning 
state-authorized price fixing where states did not “actively supervise” resulting prices). Where 
states do “actively supervise” pricing, the Court treats the resulting prices as though the state itself 
imposed them. Id. at 634–35. In such cases, the restraint in question falls into the second category 
discussed in the text. 
 6. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943). 
 7. Id. at 345, 350 (assuming such restrictions “would violate the Sherman Act if [they] were 
organized and made effective solely by virtue of a [private] contract”). 
A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  12:32 PM 
2164 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:2161 
United States, as amicus curiae.8 Invoking the Constitution’s “dual system,” in 
which states are “sovereign,” the Court declined to impute to Congress an 
intent to ban the restraint, which “derived its authority and its efficacy from 
the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or 
become effective without that command,” even though that “command” 
restrained interstate commerce as much as analogous and illegal private 
conduct.9 Nearly five decades later, the Court reiterated that Parker rested 
upon: “principles of federalism and state sovereignty,” and held that the 
Sherman Act did not ban anticompetitive restraints imposed “as an act of 
government.”10 
Subsequently the Court applied similar logic to the third category of 
state-imposed restraints, namely, bans on private wealth-creating conduct.11 
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, the Court rejected antitrust preemption 
of Maryland’s ban on vertical integration and procompetitive price 
discrimination by gasoline refiners, both of which were lawful under federal 
antitrust law.12 The Court conceded that the bans had an “anticompetitive 
effect” and interfered with “economic liberty,” the latter of which, the Court 
said, was the central policy of the Sherman Act.13 Nonetheless, the Court 
opined that antitrust preemption would “effectively destroy” states’ ability to 
regulate economic activity.14 In so holding, the Court implicitly equated 
“regulation” with coercive interference with wealth-creating activity. 
In California v. ARC America, the Court rejected Sherman Act preemption 
of state antitrust regulation, namely, a provision allowing indirect purchasers 
to recover damages from state antitrust violations.15 The Court emphasized 
 
 8. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 91, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 
(1943) (No. 46), 1942 WL 54242; HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 796 (discussing the relationship 
between preemption and the state action doctrine articulated in Parker). 
 9. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (“In a dual system of government in which, under the 
Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from 
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is 
not lightly to be attributed to Congress.”); see also id. at 350–51 (assuming that Congress may 
preempt such state restrictions). 
 10. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991); see also id. 
(“Parker emphasized the role of sovereign States in a federal system.”). 
 11. See generally Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and 
ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29 (2000) (persuasively equating state-imposed restraints 
and state bans on conduct lawful under the Sherman Act). 
 12. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133–34 (1978). 
 13. Id. at 133. 
 14. Id. (“[I]f an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state 
statute invalid, the States’ power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.”). 
 15. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989). 
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that state antitrust laws predated the Sherman Act; Congress was aware of 
these laws but did not mean to displace them when it passed the Act.16 
There appears to be a scholarly consensus that Parker, Exxon, and ARC 
America were correctly decided. Professor Hovenkamp, for instance, has 
asserted that: “nothing in the federal antitrust laws even hints that Congress 
intended to preempt state and local economic law simply because that law 
interferes with competitive markets.”17 Other scholars agree that courts 
should read the Sherman Act in light of federalism considerations, imputing 
to the 51st Congress a preference for federalism over national policy favoring 
free interstate markets.18 With rare exception, these scholars (properly) agree 
with Professor Hovenkamp that Congress could preempt state-imposed cartels 
restraining interstate commerce.19 Nonetheless, they agree that Congress did 
not choose to do so. 
There is similar agreement that the Sherman Act does not preempt state 
regulation, including antitrust regulation, banning conduct deemed 
reasonable under the Sherman Act. Here again Professor Hovenkamp is in 
the vanguard, asserting that: “the legislative history of the Sherman Act is 
replete with statements that the Act was designed to supplement rather than 
to abrogate existing state antitrust enforcement.”20 Other scholars agree, 
invoking the same federalism considerations that supposedly convinced 
Congress not to preempt state-imposed cartels.21 
 
 16. Id. at 101 & n.4. But see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972) (invoking the 
Sherman Act and the Dormant Commerce Clause as preempting state antitrust regulation of 
baseball’s reserve system). 
 17. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 793; see id. at 797 (“But no one has ever made a serious 
argument that Congress intended to use the Sherman Act to displace all forms of state and local 
regulation of prices and entry.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of 
Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 40–41 (1983) (finding no indication that Congress believed the 
Sherman Act would preempt state legislation). 
 18. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 11, at 41; William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the 
Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 
61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1136–37 (1981). 
 19. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 793 (“[T]he federal government undoubtedly has the 
power to preempt much . . . state and local regulation.”). Contrary to the views of one scholar, 
modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence would not prevent Congress from preempting state 
restraints. See Burns, supra note 11, at 38–39. But see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 
U.S. 635, 648 (2002) (authorizing suit against state officials seeking injunctive relief against state 
regulation purportedly preempted by federal law). See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 20. Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 378 (1983) 
(finding that no member of Congress expressed an intent to preempt state law); see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 815–16 (stating, with apparent approval, that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has consistently held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws or any other body of federal law 
indicates that Congress intended to displace state antitrust law”). But see HOVENKAMP, supra note 
4, at 816 (identifying rare instances in which preemption might be appropriate). 
 21. Burns, supra note 11, at 30–31 (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 723 (2nd ed. 1999)) (contending that 
Parker’s rationale justifies distinct state antitrust regulation “insofar as those laws do not require a 
violation of federal law”). 
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It seems that some antitrust scholars would prefer a different result, 
however. Professor Hovenkamp, for instance, has explained that state 
restraints can both enrich local producers and also create interstate spillovers 
that harm consumers located in other states.22 The Parker case, he explains, 
provides an example: local raisin producers reaped the benefits of the 
restraint, while out-of-state consumers paid higher prices and purchased 
reduced output.23 As Professor Hovenkamp has said, the principle of 
federalism, properly understood, does not countenance state legislation 
enriching in-state producers at the expense of out-of-state consumers.24 Thus, 
despite his belief that Parker accurately ascertained congressional intent, 
Professor Hovenkamp seems open to some limitation of the state-action 
doctrine that accounts for such spillovers.25 This endorsement seems 
unenthusiastic, however. For, in addition to opining that Parker was correctly 
decided, Professor Hovenkamp has questioned the workability of a state-
action immunity analysis that accounts for interstate spillovers, given that so 
many state-imposed restraints have some impact, no matter how small, on out-
of-state consumers.26 He also suggests that state-imposed restraints that 
produce “overwhelming” spillovers would likely offend Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.27 
Like Professor Hovenkamp, I too am uncomfortable with the Parker, 
Exxon, and ARC America trio. As others have noted, Parker arose when serious 
people believed that state-enforced cartelization or monopolization could 
 
 22. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 643–45 
(2006) (describing the problem of interstate spillovers in a regime that allows local regulation of 
interstate commerce); id. at 640 (“[C]ourts must develop a coherent doctrine with which to 
address spillovers.”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation 
and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 770–71 (1985). 
 23. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943) (“The program . . . undoubtedly affected 
the [interstate] commerce by increasing the interstate price of raisins and curtailing interstate 
shipments to some undetermined extent.”); Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 22, at 769 
(“[A]lthough all the beneficiaries of the regulation were within the jurisdiction of the regulating 
sovereign, almost all of its victims, those forced to pay a higher price because of the restrictions 
on output, were located outside. The statute effectively legalized a cartel of California raisin 
growers selling their raisins to customers located outside California.”). 
 24. Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 644 (“It is one thing to approve an anticompetitive state 
regulatory scheme when the burden falls substantially on that state’s own residents. But 
federalism does not require federal authority to permit states to export anticompetitive 
regulatory schemes. Under the current formulation of the state action exemption, extraterritorial 
impact of state regulatory schemes is not even regarded as relevant.”). 
 25. Id. at 640 (“[C]ourts must develop a coherent doctrine with which to address 
spillovers.”); id. at 645 (“A coherent doctrine of spillovers and its inclusion as a state action 
immunity requirement will therefore require some new directions in case development.”). 
 26. Id. at 645–47. 
 27. Id. at 646 (“[O]ne can imagine egregious situations in which the impact of state 
regulation falls almost entirely on out-of-state interests, but then it seems the [D]ormant 
Commerce Clause would be sufficient to handle the problem.” (citations omitted)). 
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help stabilize the macro economy—a claim that only politicians make today.28 
All three decisions countenance some regulation by political entities that do 
not internalize the full costs of their actions.29 The predictable result will be 
too many state-imposed restraints and too much state antitrust regulation. 
Such overregulation, of course, will distort the allocation of resources and 
reduce national wealth. Moreover, to the extent that such regulation reduces 
price flexibility, Parker and its progeny interfere with the process of natural 
economic adjustment and thus exacerbate recessions.30 Far from destroying 
the ability of states to engage in regulation, reversal of such decisions would 
simply confine states to “reasonable” regulation, just as the Sherman Act 
confines private parties to reasonable restraints of trade.31 Federal 
preemption of state-imposed cartels, for instance, would leave states perfectly 
free to combat externalities, produce public goods, and redistribute income 
via taxing and spending.32 
 
 28. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (describing contemporary arguments that too much competition brought on the 
Depression and that state control of production was the appropriate remedy); John T. Delacourt 
& Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1077 (2005) (noting that Parker reflected a “mindset . . . extremely skeptical 
of markets, favoring instead government industrial policy”); see also Alan J. Meese, Competition 
Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
255, 320–23 (2013) (describing arguments by proponents of the NIRA—including the United 
States—and other forms of state-sanctioned cartelization that such regulation would raise wages, 
enhance “purchasing power” and thus stimulate the macroeconomy); id. at 313 (describing 
California’s contention in Parker that the plight of the state’s raisin growers was worse than that 
of Depression-era coal and milk industries). 
 29. I do not mean to suggest that every state-imposed restraint that Congress could preempt 
under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence imposes costs on citizens in other states. Given 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to enforce meaningful limits on the commerce power, many state-
imposed restraints that Congress could preempt under current law have little if any impact on 
other states. For instance, state-imposed restraints that create barriers to entry into the 
occupation of teeth whitening, while obviously anticompetitive, do not injure out-of-state 
consumers. Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) 
(holding that state board of dental examiners had committed unfair trade practice by conspiring 
to exclude rivals from intrastate market for teeth whitening). Thus, under the original 
conception of the commerce power, such restraints would exceed the authority of Congress. See 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (opining that commerce power does not 
empower Congress to regulate “those [activities] which are completely within a particular State, 
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose 
of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce 
of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself”). But cf. Hovenkamp, supra 
note 22, at 645–46 (“[E]very state and local regulation has some spillover. For example, out-of-
state visitors may have to use the trash disposal, taxicab, hospital, or ambulance services that are 
subject to a challenged restraint.” (citations omitted)). 
 30. See infra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
 31. Cf. George W. Wickersham, The Police Power, A Product of the Rule of Reason, 27 HARV. L. 
REV. 297, 297–98 (1914) (invoking Standard Oil ’s Rule of Reason as exemplifying appropriate 
method for discerning whether legislation falls within the police power). 
 32. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 63–64 (contending that 
restraint evaluated in Parker violated the Sherman Act, but that “Congress . . . did not intend to 
A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  12:32 PM 
2168 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:2161 
At the same time, I, like Professor Hovenkamp, must take care lest I 
expand the scope of the Sherman Act beyond its original meaning, 
improperly using the Act as a license to void state legislation I deem 
counterproductive. The remainder of this Essay will examine that original 
meaning with respect to state-imposed restraints in the second and third 
categories outlined above, drawing upon the important work Professor 
Hovenkamp has already done. We will see that Professor Hovenkamp is 
absolutely correct that Congress did not subjectively intend to ban state-
imposed restraints when it passed the Sherman Act. Thus, it initially appears 
that Sherman Act preemption must depend upon a particularly dynamic 
approach to reading statutes, an approach that likely exceeds the authority of 
the courts. He is also correct, however, that Parker’s “correct” conclusion rests 
upon a “fictional reading of the legislative history of the antitrust laws.” Simply 
put, the constitutional landscape extant when Congress passed the Sherman 
Act excluded the overlapping regulatory authority that gives rise to the 
possibility of preemption.33 That landscape also included meaningful limits 
on the scope of federal power as well as Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
that was more interventionist than that found in modern Supreme Court case 
law, including Parker itself. That doctrine would have preempted state 
restraints of interstate commerce producing interstate spillovers and thus 
voided Parker-type restraints. The same doctrine also preempted state 
regulation of private restraints of interstate commerce. Finally, due process 
protection for liberty of contract precluded states from banning many 
indirect restraints of interstate or intrastate commerce. 
III. DUAL FEDERALISM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT IN 1890 
As explained previously, courts and scholars agree that Congress did not 
intend the Sherman Act to preempt state restraints. At one level, this 
consensus is irrefutable, at least if one equates “intent” with “knowledge.” 
Congress “knew” that the Sherman Act would not displace state regulation, 
no matter how injurious to interstate commerce. Thus, Congress did not 
“intend” to displace such state-imposed restraints. At the same time, 
Congress’s subjective understanding of how the Sherman Act would operate 
has nothing to do with the actual question posed in Parker, for instance. To 
understand why, we must reconstruct the source of this subjective 
understanding, again drawing upon and supplementing work Professor 
Hovenkamp has already done. 
 
deprive the states of their normal ‘police’ powers over business and industry” (footnote omitted)); 
see also infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing scope of the police power during the 
Lochner era). For instance, Sherman Act preemption of the Parker restraints would not prevent 
California from taxing its own citizens and showering the proceeds on its raisin producers. 
 33. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 797 (“The ‘state action’ doctrine itself rests on a 
fictional reading of the legislative history of the antitrust laws.”). 
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Simply put, the 51st Congress would have assumed that the Constitution 
obviated possible conflicts between federal antitrust law and state restraints. 
As understood at the time, the “dual sovereignty” that Parker and its modern 
proponents invoke actually precluded such a conflict. For one thing, Congress 
lacked authority to regulate intrastate commerce, thus leaving states with 
exclusive authority over a substantial portion of economic conduct (subject 
of course to the 14th Amendment and the Contracts Clause, for instance). At 
the same time, what power Congress did possess was generally exclusive 
(subject to an exception discussed below), whether or not Congress chose to 
exercise it. The so-called “Dormant” Commerce Clause preempted state 
regulation that burdened interstate commerce “directly” or that dealt with a 
subject that, by its “general nature, affect[ed] the commercial interests of all 
the States.”34 The subject of such regulations, the Court said, was “national” 
by “its essential character [and] belong[ed] exclusively to the Federal 
government.”35 This category, the Court said, consisted of the regulation “of 
commerce with foreign countries or between the States which consists in the 
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.”36 These classes 
of regulation, the Court said, “admit and require uniformity.”37 Absent such 
preemption, the Court said, “[t]here would . . . be no security against 
conflicting regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its 
own products and citizens, and against the products and citizens of other 
States.”38 Of course, the Court’s reference to uniform regulation was not 
entirely candid. By definition, the Dormant Commerce Clause only preempts 
state regulation when Congress has not acted. Instead of imposing uniform 
regulation, then, such preemption merely cleared the way for operation of 
the free market supported, of course, by various local forms of police power 
regulation and reasonable private contracts overcoming market failure. 
State regulation that merely restrained commerce “indirectly” or not at 
all generally fell outside congressional power and thus survived Dormant 
Commerce Clause review.39 The classic example involved exercises of the 
police power, including regulation of cartel pricing or other practices 
 
 34. Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 152 (1868); see also Cnty. of Mobile v. Kimball, 
102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880). 
 35. Hinson, 75 U.S. at 152 (“[T]here is a class of legislation . . . which, from its essential 
character, is National, and which must . . . belong exclusively to the Federal government.”); see also 
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 
1110–11 (2000) (“The Court consistently maintained that regulations touching a ‘national’ 
matter or burdening interstate commerce ‘directly’ were unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)). 
 36. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135 (1876) (holding that state regulation of rates 
for storage of grain in elevators did not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause even though most 
such grain was intended for export to other states or foreign countries and the regulation “may 
indirectly operate upon commerce outside [the state’s] immediate jurisdiction”). 
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producing market failures.40 Such regulation, which fit comfortably within the 
19th century’s classical, laissez faire economic paradigm, could facilitate or 
“aid” interstate commerce.41 
The Dormant Commerce Clause did not void every state commercial 
regulation falling within Congress’s jurisdiction, however.42 Instead, the Court 
recognized that Congress had the authority to regulate some subjects that 
were not, by their nature, inherently national and thus did not require 
uniform regulation. If, however, Congress declined to act with respect to such 
subjects, state regulation governing such subjects nonetheless survived, so 
long as such regulation did not burden interstate commerce “directly.” The 
result was a category of overlapping jurisdiction in which states could regulate 
interstate commerce as an initial matter, unless Congress affirmatively acted 
to displace such regulation.43 Examples of subjects states could regulate unless 
Congress asserted its authority included inspection and quarantine laws 
directed at interstate travel,44 dredging and improvement of harbors,45 and 
requirements that vessels entering a harbor after an interstate voyage employ 
a local pilot.46 Granting states power over such subjects in the first instance 
allowed each jurisdiction to draw on local knowledge and generate 
regulations tailored to local conditions.47 Thus, state law provided 
background rules supporting interstate commerce, subject to congressional 
override. 
Three decisions illustrate this dual federalism. The first is Gibbons v. 
Ogden. There, the Supreme Court evaluated New York’s conferral of a 
monopoly over the operation of steamships in New York waters, including 
those arriving from other states, and ultimately held that a federal licensing 
 
 40. See id. at 125–34 (sustaining regulation of rates for storage of grain as a valid exercise of 
police power). 
 41. See Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 
1836–1937, at 169–204 (1991); see also infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (explaining 
how, during this era, courts equated police power regulation with the power to combat market 
failure); cf. Munn, 94 U.S. at 133–34. 
 42. See Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1847, 1864 (2007). 
 43. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851); see also Munn, 94 U.S. at 
135 (rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to price regulation of grain elevators, but 
also suggesting that Congress may act “in reference to their inter-state relations”). 
 44. Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 465–67 (1886). 
 45. See generally Kimball, 102 U.S. 691. 
 46. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318. 
 47. See Morgan’s Steamship Co., 118 U.S. at 465 (“[Q]uarantine laws belong to that class of 
state legislation . . . which [is] valid until displaced or contravened by some legislation of 
Congress. The matter is one in which the rules that should govern it may in many respects be 
different in different localities, and for that reason be better understood and more wisely 
established by the local authorities.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203–04 (1824) 
(explaining that inspection laws promote interstate commerce and thus do not interfere with 
Congress’s commerce power). 
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statute preempted the ban.48 The Court also suggested that the dormant 
implication of the Commerce Clause preempted such state-conferred 
monopolies over interstate commerce, absent congressional legislation.49 
More than five decades later, in Kidd v. Pearson, the Court entertained a 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Iowa’s ban on the manufacture of 
alcohol, including alcohol intended for export.50 The Court invoked the 
distinction—“popular to the common mind . . . between manufactur[ing] and 
commerce”51 holding that the ban, while affecting interstate commerce, did 
not burden such commerce “directly.”52 Thus, states possessed exclusive 
authority over manufacturing. By contrast, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific 
Railway Co. v. Illinois, the Court evaluated Illinois’ regulation of the intrastate 
component of rates for interstate transportation.53 Invoking Gibbons’ 
conclusion about the scope of Congress’s power and analogizing rail 
transportation to the steamship business over which New York had conferred 
monopoly, the Court held that the Commerce Clause preempted such 
regulation, even absent congressional action.54 The Constitution, the Court 
said, confided such authority in Congress alone, because that body’s 
“enlarged view of the interests of all the States, and of the railroads concerned, 
better fits it to establish just and equitable rules.”55 Such regulation was thus 
“of a general and national character, and cannot be safely and wisely remitted 
to local rules and local regulations.”56 
The Congress that considered and passed the Sherman Act was aware of 
Gibbons, Kidd, and Wabash, and there is no indication that it had a different 
conception of the commerce power. Indeed, Congress filled the regulatory 
vacuum left by Wabash by passing the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887.57 
Moreover, Kidd fueled concerns that Sherman’s initial draft—which banned 
 
 48. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 218–22. See generally Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1398 (2004). 
 49. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 204–09; see also Williams, supra note 48. 
 50. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 15 (1888). 
 51. Id. at 20. 
 52. Id. at 23 (“[L]egislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and 
persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the 
Constitution, unless, under the guise of police regulations, it imposes a direct burden upon 
interstate commerce, or interferes directly with its freedom.” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 53. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); see also HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 41, at 161–63 (discussing Wabash). 
 54. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 573 (“The argument on this subject[, the reach of Congress’s power,] 
can never be better stated than it is by Chief Justice Marshall.” (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195–96)). 
 55. Id. at 577. 
 56. Id.; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 159–64 (discussing “extraterritorial effect” of 
state rate regulation and resulting “free riding” by states that imposed such regulation). 
 57. See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see also WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
120–22 (2010) (reporting that outcry over Wabash led to the Interstate Commerce Act). 
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restraints of “production[] or manufacture”—exceeded Congress’s 
authority.58 The Senate therefore referred the bill to the Judiciary Committee, 
where Senators more conversant with constitutional principles would 
radically overhaul Sherman’s initial draft.59 In the final version, the 
Committee omitted references to production or manufacture, and banned 
instead contracts in “restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States.”60 This final language empowered courts to determine the reach of the 
Act, based upon the judiciary’s view of the scope of the commerce power. The 
Supreme Court, in turn, would subsequently hold that, when it passed the 
Sherman Act, Congress meant to exercise the full extent of its Commerce 
Clause power.61 This assumption set the stage for continued expansion of the 
Sherman Act as the commerce power expanded over time. 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court invoked its dual federalism 
jurisprudence when first interpreting the Sherman Act. In E.C. Knight, for 
instance, the Court evaluated a merger that created a monopoly over the 
production of sugar in the United States.62 The Court reiterated Kidd and 
related decisions holding that states possessed exclusive authority to regulate 
manufacturing.63 While control over production influenced commerce and 
was necessary to its existence, such control only affected commerce 
“incidentally and indirectly.”64 Thus, the Court confirmed that states retained 
exclusive authority over manufacturing, mining, and agriculture—including 
the authority to impose antitrust regulation or rules of corporate governance 
 
 58. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 1890–1916: 
THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 107 (1988) (reporting the language of Sherman’s original 
bill); id. at 113–14 (reporting opposition to Sherman’s bill on Commerce Clause grounds); id. at 
113 (noting that Kidd made concerns over the scope of Congress’s authority “particularly salient”); 
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 
171–73 (1995) (reporting 1889 remarks by Senator George invoking Kidd and other Commerce 
Clause decisions contending that Sherman’s original bill exceeded the commerce power); id. at 175 
(reporting a similar 1890 speech by Senator George). 
 59. SKLAR, supra note 58, at 114–115. 
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see also SKLAR, supra note 58, at 114–17; THORELLI, supra note 
58, at 197–99 (concluding that constitutional objections to the bill induced the reference to the 
Judiciary Committee). 
 61. See, e.g., Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976); United 
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 
U.S. 469, 495 (1940). 
 62. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 2–8 (1895). 
 63. Id. at 13–16; id. at 15–16 (“In Gibbons v Ogden, Brown v Maryland, and other cases often 
cited, the state laws, which were held inoperative, were instances of direct interference with, or 
regulations of, interstate or international commerce, yet in Kidd v Pearson the [ban on 
manufacturing] was held not to directly affect external commerce . . . .”); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 
517, 525 (1886); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448–49 (1827); Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 37–39 (1824). 
 64. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 12 (“The power to regulate commerce is the power to 
prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of the 
power to suppress monopoly.”). 
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prohibiting monopolistic transactions.65 “It was in the light of well-settled 
principles that the act of July 2, 1890, was framed,” the Court said.66 
A few years later, in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, the Court invoked 
categories from its dual federalism jurisprudence to reject the claim that the 
Sherman Act banned “ordinary contracts and combinations,” such as the 
formation of a partnership in interstate commerce “between two persons 
previously engaged in the same line of business,” and thus infringed liberty of 
contract.67 While the Act purported to ban all restraints of commerce among 
the several states, the Court gave the statute a “reasonable construction.”68 
The Court thus held that Congress only meant to ban direct restraints of 
interstate commerce, and not those agreements or other practices (like the 
formation of a partnership) whose impact on interstate commerce was 
“indirect” or “remote.”69 
As read by E.C. Knight and Joint Traffic, then, the Sherman Act performed 
the same function with respect to direct private restraints that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause performed vis-à-vis direct public restraints, namely, it 
banned them. The Act also left indirect private restraints unscathed, just as 
the Dormant Commerce Clause left indirect public restraints unscathed. 
Whether a public or private restraint was “direct” or “indirect” was a question 
of substance and not of form, turning upon the Court’s assessment of the 
restraint’s impact on interstate commerce. Thus, a private restraint that 
replicated a public restraint deemed direct could nonetheless be “indirect” if 
its impact on commerce was less pronounced.70 
 
 65. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of 
American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304 (1979); see also HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 41, at 262–63 (contending that states relied upon the law of trade restraints, not corporate 
law, to impose such regulation). 
 66. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16. 
 67. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566–67 (1898). See generally William 
D. Guthrie, Constitutionality of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, as Interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court in the Case of the Trans-Missouri Traffic Association, 11 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1897) 
(articulating this argument). 
 68. See Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 568 (“[T]he act of Congress must have a reasonable 
construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business men that 
could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and 
possibly to restrain it.” (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))). 
 69. Id. at 566 (noting that the Sherman Act does not outlaw “ordinary contracts and 
combinations” protected by liberty of contract); see also Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the 
Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (1999) (explaining how Joint Traffic’s narrow construction 
of the Sherman Act protected agreements sheltered by liberty of contract and saved the statute 
from invalidation). 
 70. See, e.g., Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 587–88, 592–94, 596 (declaring a challenged restraint 
indirect even though an analogous restraint imposed by the state legislature would abridge liberty 
of contract and restrain interstate commerce directly); id. at 602–03; see also Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229–30 (1899) (noting that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes Congress to regulate some private contracts because “[t]he private contracts may in 
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In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, the Court invoked Wabash-like 
reasoning and confirmed that states lacked authority to regulate contracts 
directly restraining interstate commerce.71 The United States challenged a 
multi-state cartel that set prices more than 30% above cost, plus a reasonable 
rate of return, for pipe made in one state and sold in another.72 Defendants 
contended that the Commerce Clause only empowered Congress to preempt 
state-imposed restraints, leaving private restraints to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the states.73 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Commerce Clause 
empowered Congress to ban certain private agreements. After all, the Court 
said, “private contracts may in truth be as far reaching in their effect upon 
interstate commerce as would the legislation of a single state of the same 
character.”74 Where that effect was to directly and substantially restrain 
interstate commerce, such contracts were “an attempt to regulate a subject 
which, for the purpose of regulation, has been, with some exceptions . . . 
exclusively granted to Congress . . . .”75 The Commerce Clause empowered 
Congress to ban such agreements, just as it empowered Congress to preempt 
state enactments that directly restrained interstate commerce.76 
The Court also predicted that acceptance of the defendants’ claim that 
states possessed exclusive jurisdiction over such agreements would mean that: 
“the legislation of the different States might and probably would differ in 
regard to the matter, according to what each State might regard as its own 
particular interest.”77 Echoing the logic of Wabash, then, the Court opined 
that Congress was better positioned than individual states to legislate 
regarding agreements directly restraining interstate commerce. In modern 
parlance, competition between the states would produce a race to the bottom, 
as states that did not internalize the full impact of restraints would pursue 
their “interest” by enforcing or at least declining to ban such agreements, 
exporting harm to other states.78 Congress, however, was “the proper 
 
truth be as far reaching in their effect upon interstate commerce as would the [state] 
legislation . . . of the same character” (emphasis added)). 
 71. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 232–35. 
 72. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as 
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 73. See generally id. at 278–79. 
 74. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229–30 (emphases added). 
 75. Id. at 231 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 229 (“If certain kinds of private contracts do directly, as already stated, limit or 
restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce, why should not the power of Congress reach 
those contracts just the same as if the legislation of some state had enacted the provisions 
contained in them?”); id. at 231 (“Congress should have jurisdiction as much in the one case as 
in the other.”). 
 77. Id. at 231. 
 78. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886). 
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representative of the nation at large,”79 and there was a “great importance of 
having but one source for the law which regulates [interstate] commerce 
throughout the length and breadth of the land . . . .”80 Presumably Congress 
would consider the nation’s welfare when legislating on the subject and thus 
produce a uniform rule that reconciled various competing interests.81 
The Court hastened to add that Congress lacked authority to regulate 
agreements whose impact was felt “wholly within [a state’s] own 
borders . . . .”82 The commerce power, the Court said, did not reach 
“commerce which is wholly within a State,” with the result that the Sherman 
Act did not govern “combinations or agreements so far as they relate to a 
restraint of such [intrastate] trade or commerce.”83 Thus, the Court narrowed 
the Sixth Circuit’s decree so as not to prevent firms from combining with 
respect “to contracts for selling pipe in their own State,” even if a member of 
the combination from another state won the contract and made an interstate 
sale.84 
The Court’s holding that Congress could ban only direct restraints of 
interstate commerce replicated the distinction, drawn in Gibbons, between 
interstate commerce and commerce internal to one state.85 Moreover, the 
Court’s assertion that states lacked the proper incentives to regulate 
agreements in the former category followed naturally from the logic of 
Wabash. Indeed, the logic predated (barely) the ratification of the 
Constitution. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson 
explained the rationale for the scope and limits of Federal Power: 
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and 
effects, within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered 
as belonging to the government of that state; whatever object of 
government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds 
of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the 
government of the United States.86 
 
 79. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 230. 
 80. Id. at 233. 
 81. See Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577; see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345 (1904) 
(“No State can, by merely creating a corporation, or in any other mode, project its authority into 
other States, and across the continent, so as to prevent Congress from exerting the power it 
possesses under the Constitution over interstate and international commerce . . . .”). 
 82. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 233. 
 83. Id. at 247. 
 84. Id. at 247–48. 
 85. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
 86. See The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (Nov. 21, 1787) (statement of James Wilson), reprinted in 2 JONATHAN 
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 415, 424 (2d ed. 1996). 
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Thus, the impact of some direct restraints fell only upon the citizens of a 
single state, such that regulation of such restraints “belong[ed] to the 
government of that state.”87 However, the impact of some other direct 
restraints fell “beyond the bounds of a particular state” and thus “belong[ed] 
to the government of the United States.”88 Indirect restraints, even those of 
interstate commerce, also fell outside the scope of Congress’s power, 
presumably because the Court believed that states possessed appropriate 
incentives to generate optimal rules governing such agreements. Indeed, both 
before and after Addyston Pipe, the Court unanimously rejected Sherman Act 
challenges to indirect contractual restraints of interstate commerce, leaving 
regulation of such agreements to individual states.89 Such regulation, 
however, was subject to the strictures of liberty of contract.90 
It should be noted that Wilson, Gibbons, Wabash, and Addyston Pipe 
articulated a principle, a principle that did not decide concrete cases in the 
abstract. Instead, courts were obliged to apply this principle in light of the 
facts, including background legal rules, bearing upon the impact of the 
regulated conduct. Such facts could change over time, as the national 
economy became more integrated, thereby changing the boundaries between 
state and federal power.91 
To be sure, Addyston Pipe applied a statute exercising Congress’s 
commerce power. The Court did not hold that the Dormant Commerce 
Clause itself, which preempts state legislation, preempted the private 
agreements before the Court. Still, the Court made it plain that the power to 
regulate direct private restraints of interstate commerce resided exclusively 
with Congress. This was no surprise, given precedent holding that the 
interstate “transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities” was 
a subject exclusively reserved to Congress.92 Direct private restraints of such 
commerce, the Court said, regulated a subject “which, for the purpose of 
regulation, has been, with some exceptions . . . exclusively granted to 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Cincinnati, Portsmouth, Big Sandy & Pomeroy Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 184 
(1906) (declining to condemn covenant not to compete in the transportation of freight and 
passengers along the Ohio River because any impact on interstate commerce was merely 
incidental and did not reflect “the dominant purpose of the contract”); Anderson v. United 
States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). 
 90. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); see also infra notes 109–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 
125, 137–42 (1995) (explaining how increased integration of the national economy naturally 
resulted in more expansive congressional authority as more “local” activities produced interstate 
impacts); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter 
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]. 
 92. See Cnty. of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1880). 
A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  12:32 PM 
2015] ANTITRUST FEDERALISM & STATE RESTRAINTS 2177 
Congress.”93 None of the exceptions—for local quarantine laws, pilotage laws, 
and the like—applied, however.94 The importance of uniformity in this 
context, the Court said, “cannot, in our opinion, be overestimated.”95 Finally, 
the Court attributed the absence of state legislation on the subject to a belief 
that “it was supposed to be a subject over which state legislatures had no 
jurisdiction.”96 In fact, even before Addyston Pipe, at least one federal court 
held that state antitrust regulation of interstate commerce contravened the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.97 After Addyston Pipe, the Eighth Circuit held that 
state antitrust regulation of contracts that directly related to interstate 
commerce “imping[ed] upon the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate 
commerce among the several states.”98 In support of this holding, the court 
cited that portion of the Addyston Pipe opinion that explained why Congress 
possessed exclusive regulatory authority over the contracts before the Court.99 
 
 93. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231 (1899) (citations 
omitted); see also id. at 232 (“The reason why no state legislation upon the subject has been 
enacted has probably been because it was supposed to be a subject over which state legislatures 
had no jurisdiction.”). 
 94. The Court cited four cases for the proposition that there were exceptions to Congress’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce. Id. at 231 (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 
U.S. 650, 660–61 (1896); Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 488 (1888); Morgan’s 
S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 465 (1886); Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697). In Kimball, the 
Court held that state legislation to improve Mobile harbor, while falling within the jurisdiction of 
Congress, also fell into the category of “subjects local in their nature, or intended as mere aids to 
commerce,” and thus did not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause. Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697. 
Morgan’s Steamship Co. reached the same conclusion about Louisiana’s system of quarantine laws 
that applied to vessels arriving in New Orleans. Morgan’s S.S. Co., 118 U.S. at 465. Bowman 
invalidated an Iowa statute prohibiting the importation of “intoxicating liquors.” Bowman, 125 
U.S. at 474, 500. Finally, James sustained Georgia’s imposition of liability upon telegraph 
companies that failed to employ due diligence to ensure the timely delivery of telegraphed 
messages. James, 162 U.S. at 661. 
None of these decisions suggested that states possess concurrent jurisdiction to ban or 
authorize direct restraints of interstate commerce. In Kimball, for instance, the Court emphasized 
Congress’s exclusive power over “all that portion of commerce with foreign countries or between 
the States which consists in the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.” 
Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697. Regarding such conduct, the Court said, “there can of necessity be only 
one system or plan of regulations.” Id. “There would otherwise be no security against conflicting 
regulations of different States, each discriminating in favor of its own products and citizens . . . .” Id. 
(emphasis added). In such cases, Congress’s “non-action . . . is a declaration of its purpose that 
the commerce in that commodity or by that means of transportation shall be free.” Id. 
 95. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 233. 
 96. Id. at 232. 
 97. In re Grice, 79 F. 627, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1897), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Baker v. 
Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898). 
 98. Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F. 242, 244 (8th Cir. 1906) 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Fullerton Lumber Co., 152 N.W. 708, 711–12 (S.D. 1915) 
(stating that state antitrust law only applied when challenged restraints “affect trade or commerce 
wholly within the state”). 
 99. See Hadley Dean Plate Glass, 143 F. at 244 (citing, among other cases, Addyston Pipe, 175 
U.S. at 229–33). 
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Several other courts agreed.100 Finally, during the first third of the 20th 
century, the Court repeatedly invalidated state price regulation of interstate 
commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause.101 
The dual federalism of 1890 plainly prevented Congress from banning 
restraints, whether direct or indirect, of intrastate commerce. Moreover, the 
same dual federalism prevented states from imposing or banning direct 
restraints of interstate commerce.102 What, though, about regulation of 
indirect restraints of interstate commerce? If Congress had no authority over 
such private restraints in the first place, as the Court held in E.C. Knight and 
Joint Traffic, then state regulation could not offend the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.103 Moreover, countless decisions affirmed the ability of states to impose 
indirect restraints on interstate commerce via police-power regulation.104 
Indeed, E.C. Knight expressly stated that regulation of monopolistic control of 
 
 100. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 376 n.5; James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in 
the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law: 1880–1918, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 495, 518 & n.117 (1987) (collecting numerous authorities for the proposition that 
“[f]ederal and state jurists often declared that the states could not constitutionally regulate 
anticompetitive activity within interstate commerce, and some significant limitations on the scope 
of state antitrust provisions were established on this basis” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., State v. 
Va.–Carolina Chem. Co., 51 S.E. 455, 461 (S.C. 1905) (“[T]his clause [of the state antitrust 
statute] is an attempt by the state to exercise a prerogative of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce. No act of Congress has invested the state with authority to interfere with this subject 
of commerce.”). 
 101. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927) 
(invalidating a state regulation of the price of electricity, which regulated party exported to other 
states); Missouri ex rel Barrett v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 308–10 (1924) (invalidating 
state regulation of the price of natural gas, which regulated parties exported to other states); 
Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 61 (1922) (striking down a regulation of the price of 
grain, which regulated parties exported to other states). 
 102. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 797–98 (“The [Parker] Court found that when Congress 
passed the Sherman Act in 1890 it never intended the statute to undermine the regulatory power 
of state and local governments. But the prevailing view of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause in 1890 was that Congress could not have done this even had it wished to. Under that 
view, which the Supreme Court confirmed in its . . . E. C. Knight decision, the federal government 
had no power to regulate markets that were perceived to be purely intrastate. By the same token, 
extraterritorial . . . regulation was unconstitutional. Under this regime of ‘dual federalism,’ any 
form of regulation that was within the regulatory power of state and local government[s] was 
outside the reach of the federal antitrust laws. Small wonder that the Supreme Court could find 
no evidence that the Sherman Act’s framers intended to control state and local regulation.”); 
Hovenkamp & Mackerron, supra note 22, at 727 (“In Parker the Court effectively read Wickard 
into the legislative history of the antitrust laws and then decided that Congress had not intended 
to reach intrastate conduct mandated by the state itself.”). 
 103. See generally McCurdy, supra note 65, at 304. Indeed, some scholars have pointed out 
that federal regulatory efforts were few and far between in the 19th century, with the result that 
rejection of such challenges confirmed state regulatory authority and bolstered regulation. See, 
e.g., Cushman, supra note 35, at 1121 (“[T]he principal function of locating such activities in the 
local sphere and holding that they affected interstate commerce only indirectly was not to 
frustrate federal regulation, but instead to insulate state and local regulatory and taxing initiatives 
from [D]ormant Commerce Clause attack.” (footnote omitted)). 
 104. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
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production that “indirectly” affected interstate commerce was a matter of 
“internal police.”105 It would thus seem that the dual federalism of the 1890s 
left states perfectly free to regulate and even ban indirect restraints of 
interstate commerce.106 If so, the 51st Congress may well have anticipated that 
states would have the authority to ban perfectly reasonable, wealth-creating 
restraints, just as some modern states have attempted to ban, say, minimum 
rpm as unlawful per se.107 
There is, however, another relevant source of federal law, namely, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both before and after 
1890, state courts held that this clause protects economic liberty, including 
the liberty to contract, against regulation that exceeded the police power.108 
Unlike legislative restraints, private restraints are (generally) voluntary 
contracts. In 1887, Supreme Court dicta signaled that regulation of economic 
activity had limits.109 Professor Hovenkamp has persuasively argued that the 
Court took a Pigouvian approach to defining the scope of the police power, 
sustaining only those abridgments of liberty or property that combatted 
externalities or other forms of market failure.110 A ban on private “direct 
restraints” of intrastate commerce or prohibition of a merger resulting in a 
monopoly (an indirect but harmful restraint) would certainly satisfy this 
test.111 However, a ban on indirect restraints that produced no harm would 
not.112 
 
 105. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895). 
 106. Id. at 13 (“It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police 
power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be 
recognized and observed . . . .”); see also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 24 (1888). 
 107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Frorer v. People, 31 N.E. 395 (Ill. 1892); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1888) 
(Peckham, J.) (voiding a ban on a retailer’s practice of giving away free products to induce sales); 
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886); People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29 (N.Y. 1885) (voiding a 
ban on the sale of oleomargarine); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885) (voiding a ban on cigar 
manufacture in tenement houses)(voiding an anti-scrip law as infringing upon the laborer’s right 
to contract for satisfactory compensation); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: 
DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 16–20 (2011) (collecting and 
discussing these and other decisions). 
 109. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“There are, of necessity, limits beyond 
which [police power] legislation cannot rightfully go.”). 
 110. HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 200–01; id. at 201 (stating that the Court only sustained 
such regulation when it found “a ‘substantial divergence between the public interest and private 
right’—a legal concept similar to Pigou’s ‘divergence between social and private net product’”). 
 111. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13–14 (finding that regulation of monopolies fell within 
the police power); Meese, supra note 69, at 75–80 (discussing decisions sustaining state bans on 
horizontal price fixing as police power regulation); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 131 (1876) 
(sustaining regulation of price set by nine firms owning grain elevators that agreed on prices and 
published the resulting prices in local newspapers, because “all the elevating facilities [in the 
region were] a ‘virtual’ monopoly”). 
 112. See infra notes 119–23 and accompanying text (recounting holding in Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco that ban on harmless restraints would offend liberty of contract). 
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Thus, while state regulation of indirect restraints of interstate commerce 
could not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause, many such restraints found 
protection in liberty of contract. Indeed, in Joint Traffic, the defendants 
claimed that the Sherman Act abridged liberty of contract precisely because, 
as read in Trans-Missouri Freight, the Act purportedly banned various everyday 
contracts and combinations, including covenants ancillary to the sale of a 
business, the formation of partnerships, mergers, and covenants ancillary to 
the formation of partnerships.113 The Court rejected this claim, holding that 
the statute should receive a “reasonable construction” and did not reach these 
contracts precisely because they only restrained trade, if at all, indirectly.114 
The implication seemed clear: Banning all such contracts, what Peckham 
called “ordinary contracts and combinations,” could exceed the police power, 
abridging liberty of contract.115 Moreover, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment limited all state action, such protection extended to indirect 
restraints of intrastate commerce as well.116 Indeed, just two years before 
passage of the Sherman Act, Peckham had authored an opinion for the New 
York Court of Appeals voiding, as abridging “fundamental and valuable 
rights” the state’s effort to criminalize a retailer’s practice of giving away a tea 
cup and saucer with the purchase of coffee.117 
The Court confirmed this reading of liberty of contract in Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, holding that a ban on every contract restraining trade would 
destroy contractual liberty and undermine wealth-creating trade.118 Thus, the 
Court said, the Sherman Act bans only unreasonable restraints of trade, defined 
as agreements that produce monopoly or the consequences of monopoly: 
prices, output, or quality departing from the competitive level.119 This Rule of 
Reason empowered courts to invalidate both “direct” restraints of interstate 
commerce as well as that small subset of “indirect” restraints that produced 
harm, e.g., a merger that resulted in a monopoly restraining interstate 
 
 113. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 566 (1898); see also United States v. 
Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 332–43 (1897). 
 114. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. at 568. 
 115. Id. at 566 (referring to such agreements as “ordinary contracts and combinations”); see 
also id. at 572 (confirming that the decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), which 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected liberty of contract, applied equally to the Fifth 
Amendment and thus limited the authority of Congress). 
 116. The practices that Peckham protected in Gillson, for instance, did not affect interstate 
commerce, whether directly or indirectly. 
 117. People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 399 (N.Y. 1888) (Peckham, J.). 
 118. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911); see also Alan J. Meese, 
Standard Oil as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 787–90 (2012) (explaining that 
Standard Oil read the Sherman Act narrowly so as not to infringe liberty of contract). 
 119. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60–61; see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition and the 
Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 84–89 (describing Standard Oil’s adoption of the Rule of 
Reason); id. at 88–89 (recounting decision’s conclusion that only agreements producing higher 
prices, reduced output or lower quality are unreasonable). 
A12_MEESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  12:32 PM 
2015] ANTITRUST FEDERALISM & STATE RESTRAINTS 2181 
commerce.120 Indeed, in American Tobacco, the same Court emphasized that 
the statute did not ban “normal and usual contracts essential to individual 
freedom.”121 The Court also noted a connection between the protection of 
such agreements on the one hand, and robust interstate commerce on the 
other. That is, the Court opined that a ban on such agreements, presumably 
from any source, would “render difficult if not impossible any movement of 
trade in the channels of interstate commerce—the free movement of which it 
was the purpose of the statute to protect.”122 In the same way, of course, the 
Court had previously opined that state police-power regulation restraining 
commerce indirectly overcame externalities and other market failures and thus 
aided interstate commerce. In this sense, then, both private and state-imposed 
indirect restraints served the same overall economic purpose: overcoming 
market failures and improving upon the results that atomistic markets might 
produce.123 Taken together, the Fourteenth Amendment and Dormant 
Commerce Clause protected one such category (private restraints), while 
declining to preempt the other (indirect public restraints). While both types 
of restraints were beyond the reach of Congress’s commerce power, both also 
helped support and facilitate interstate commerce, thereby ensuring a well-
functioning national market. 
To summarize, Professor Hovenkamp and others correctly conclude that 
Congress did not subjectively anticipate Sherman Act preemption of state-
imposed restraints. However, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained, this 
does not mean that Congress anticipated that states could authorize interstate 
cartels or monopolies or ban indirect restraints. On the contrary, a Congress 
well attuned to the precedents of the day would have understood that it lacked 
authority to preempt state regulation of any restraints, direct or indirect, of 
intrastate commerce. Moreover, the same Congress would have understood 
that state imposition or regulation of direct restraints of interstate commerce 
would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Finally, Congress would have 
understood that judicial protection for liberty of contract by state and federal 
 
 120. Meese, supra note 118, at 796–97 (explaining that Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason allowed 
courts to reach indirect restraints that produced anticompetitive harm). 
 121. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180–81 (1911). Standard Oil held that 
“the words restraint of trade should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual 
right to contract.” Id. at 180. 
 122. Id.; see also Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460–61 (8th Cir. 1903) (holding 
a ban on liberty to set prices would destroy competition more surely than any private restraint 
and that “[t]he exercise of [such] rights is essential to the very existence of free competition” and 
thus does not “constitute any . . . restraint upon interstate trade”). 
 123. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 381–82 (1966) (explaining how restraints ancillary to the formation 
of a partnership could prevent market failure that would result from atomistic rivalry between 
partners); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281–82 (1898) (Taft, J.) 
(explaining that the common law “encouraged” such restraints because they induced partners to 
focus their efforts on the partnership). 
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courts would have significantly limited states’ ability to ban indirect restraints 
of interstate or intrastate commerce, thereby leaving parties free to adopt 
agreements that facilitated interstate commerce. 
In short, as understood during antitrust’s formative era, the Constitution 
simply took state regulation of interstate commerce and prohibition of 
reasonable restraints of any commerce “off the table.” Sherman Act 
preemption of such state regulation would have been redundant, analogous 
to (hypothetical) federal legislation banning state statutes impairing the 
obligation of contracts involving interstate commerce.124 This constitutional 
framework left states free to ban direct restraints of intrastate commerce and 
a subset—probably a small subset—of indirect restraints of intrastate and 
interstate commerce namely, those that produced harm in the form of higher 
prices or lower output.125 
Put affirmatively, Congress anticipated that the Sherman Act would ban 
private restraints, period, and thus not preempt state legislation that imposed 
unreasonable restraints or banned reasonable ones. However, contrary to the 
assertions of Parker, its progeny, and many of its proponents, this limitation 
on the Sherman Act did not reflect any congressional concern for “state 
sovereignty” or “federalism values.” To paraphrase Professor Hovenkamp, any 
such congressional concern is entirely fictitious.126 Instead, Congress would 
have assumed that, federalism or not, the Constitution ousted states from 
adopting such regulations. Modern invocations of federalism and dual 
sovereignty are simply ex post rationalizations of judicial refusal to preempt 
unreasonable state-imposed restraints. 
IV. THE FALL OF DUAL FEDERALISM AND LIBERTY OF CONTRACT 
The formative era’s constitutional foundations crumbled abruptly during 
the 1930s.127 First, the Court famously abandoned numerous decisions 
protecting liberty of contract.128 Second, and as famously, the Supreme Court 
 
 124. Of course, federal legislation enforcing constitutional provisions is not unheard of. See 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 2002a-1 (2012) (forbidding discrimination “required 
by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or order of a State or any agency or political 
subdivision thereof”). 
 125. In this connection it should be noted that much state regulation that indirectly 
restrained interstate commerce, such as the dredging of harbors or the inspection of vessels 
screening for diseased passengers, did not burden liberty of contract. 
 126. HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 797. 
 127. See Meese, supra note 28, at 296–320 (recounting various Supreme Court decisions 
abandoning liberty of contract, removing meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce power, and 
weakening Dormant Commerce Clause standards). 
 128. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (overruling Adkins 
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533–39 (1934). 
Nebbia, it should be noted, rejected the definition of industries “affected with a public interest” 
the Court had unanimously adopted just over a decade earlier. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 509–10; see also 
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of Kan., 262 U.S. 522, 535–42 (1923). 
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removed meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce power, allowing 
Congress to regulate what the Court had previously treated as intrastate 
commerce.129 No doubt some such expansion was natural and inevitable, 
given the integration of the nation’s economy, aided by evolving legal 
institutions (such as more flexible incorporation statutes) and technology. 
Moreover, evolving technology and legal institutions also created 
opportunities for firms, either individually or collectively, to realize 
economies of scale that gave rise to barriers to entry, a concept foreign to 
many jurists in the 1880s and 1890s.130 These changes rendered it more likely 
that “object[s] of government” once deemed purely local could exceed the 
bounds of a particular state, with the result that states would exercise exclusive 
authority over such objects “in their particular interest,” thereby resulting in 
suboptimal legislation.131 If so, fidelity to the principle of political economy 
that animated the scope of the commerce power required the Court to 
recognize a broader reach of that power.132 In the antitrust context, these 
changes could justify application of the Sherman Act to activities, such as 
manufacturing, once thought to be within the exclusive control of states, 
 
 129. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (stating that commerce power 
extends to activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if effect is merely 
“indirect”); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1941) (explaining that Congress may 
ban unfair labor practices by firms producing for interstate commerce regardless of volume of 
production); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Friedman–Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 
(1937) (sustaining ban on labor practices at a single clothing factory in unconcentrated market); 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–43 (1937). 
 130. Cf. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1895) (declining to opine on 
whether “because others were theoretically left free to go into the business . . . therefore no 
objectionable restraint was imposed”); People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 693 (N.Y. 
1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting) (asserting that cartels could not maintain prices above the 
competitive level without state aid because such prices would immediately attract new entry). As 
Professor Hovenkamp has explained: 
Within the classical paradigm, monopoly prices could never be earned in any 
industry unless people were artificially restrained from entering. . . . A mere 
agreement among sellers to fix prices was of little concern, provided that neither the 
price fixers nor the state forbade others from entering the field. If the cartel 
members sought to charge monopoly prices, new competition would immediately 
frustrate their attempt. 
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 282–83; see also Meese, supra note 69, at 66-67 (explaining how 
Justice Peckham’s Addyston Pipe opinion reflected revised understanding of the possible impact 
of private horizontal price fixing). 
 131. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 229–33 (1899); Wabash, 
St Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886); The Debates in the Convention of 
the State of Pennsylvania, supra note 86, at 424; see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 
41–43 (rejecting defendant’s claim that a work stoppage at one of the nation’s largest steel 
companies would have only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce); id. at 41 (stating that 
such an effect would be “immediate” and perhaps “catastrophic”). 
 132. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 91, at 1224–28. 
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given the assumption that Congress meant to exercise all of the power it 
exercised when it passed the Act.133 
However, the post-1937 revolution in Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
did more than apply a permanent principle in light of new circumstances.134 
Instead, the Court simply declined to place economically sensible limits on 
Congress’s power. As a result, the Court repeatedly upheld federal legislation 
dealing with purely local matters, in which the object of legislation did not, 
even in the modern era, extend beyond any particular state.135 In so doing, 
the Court often deferred to congressional determinations that the regulated 
activity, when aggregated with other similar activities, had a “substantial 
effect” on interstate commerce.136 In the antitrust context, where Congress 
had made no such findings, the Court nonetheless extended the Sherman Act 
to cover purely local restraints with attenuated connections to interstate 
commerce, reasoning that Congress had meant to exercise the full extent of 
its commerce authority when it passed the Act.137 If taken to its logical 
conclusion, such an approach would confer Sherman Act jurisdiction over any 
private restraint, no matter how local, because any such restraint, when 
combined with others, would have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.138 Still, the Court has never followed this logic to its ultimate 
conclusion, but has instead required a case-by-case assessment to ascertain 
some connection between the defendants’ activities (albeit not the restraint 
itself) and interstate commerce.139 
 
 133. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 259–60 (describing how states lacked appropriate 
incentives to develop corporate law preventing anticompetitive mergers). 
 134. See generally Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 91. 
 135. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friedman–Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1936) 
(sustaining a ban on unfair labor practices at one clothing factory in an unconcentrated market). 
 136. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
119–20 (1941). 
 137. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792–93 (1975) (applying the Sherman Act to 
price fixing for title searches in one county); Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321–22 (1967) 
(applying the Sherman Act to statewide collusion between Oklahoma’s liquor wholesalers). The 
“objects” of such regulation were confined to Virginia and Oklahoma, respectively, with the result 
that the interests of individual states aligned with the national interest. Therefore, the logic of 
Addyston Pipe, Wabash, and Gibbons did not justify federal regulation. See Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. 
Yahya, The Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 403 (2004) (contending that it is inappropriate to rely upon aggregation test to 
establish Sherman Act jurisdiction given absence of congressional findings necessary to justify 
such an approach). 
 138. See generally Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137, at 444–45 (explaining that Court’s post-
1937 aggregation test could confer Sherman Act jurisdiction over restraints with a “trivial” impact 
if taken to logical conclusion); Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of 
Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 682 n.113 (1993) (stating that application of 
Wickard in the Sherman Act context may result in overlap between state and federal antitrust 
regulatory authority). 
 139. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242–45 (1980) 
(finding Sherman Act jurisdiction when the defendants’ activities, and not the restraint itself, had 
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Third, and less famously, the Court relaxed Dormant Commerce Clause 
limits on state regulation of interstate commerce, “unshackling” states to 
regulate commerce that would otherwise have fallen exclusively within 
Congress’s now much-expanded jurisdiction.140 The post-1937 Dormant 
Commerce Clause test banned only those state enactments that: (1) expressly 
discriminated against out-of-state commerce; or (2) while facially neutral, 
nonetheless substantially burdened interstate commerce without a rational 
basis.141 State statutes that are neutral on their face have almost always survived 
such scrutiny. 
The decision in Parker, issued in 1943, exemplified such relaxation. It is 
well known that the Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to California’s 
coercive reduction in raisin output, 90–95% of which was exported to other 
states or foreign countries.142 But the petitioner also claimed that California’s 
scheme contravened the Dormant Commerce Clause, a position seconded by 
the Solicitor General and famed trustbuster Thurman Arnold, then heading 
the Antitrust Division.143 Before 1937, this argument would have failed 
because Congress lacked the authority to regulate agriculture.144 However, 
the recent vast expansion of congressional authority under the aegis of the 
Commerce Clause placed California’s pro-rate scheme squarely within 
Congress’s jurisdiction.145 Congressional power over such restraints flowed 
 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce); cf. United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 
326, 338–40 (1952) (finding an agreement between Oregon physicians governing prepaid 
medical care did not restrain interstate commerce); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947) (finding that collusion on taxi fares between Chicago homes and railroad 
stations was “too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof within the meaning 
of the Sherman Act”). 
 140. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 483, 521 (1997) (reporting that, in 1938, the New Deal Supreme Court “announced 
a radical reconsideration of the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence” (citing S.C. 
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938))). 
 141. See United Haulers Ass’n, v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338–47 (2007); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970); S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 303 
U.S. at 191–96 (sustaining facially neutral regulation of trucks after identifying a rational basis); 
Gardbaum, supra note 139, at 521–32 (recounting in detail these doctrinal developments). 
 142. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 53–91; id. at 65 (“A state 
legislative program eliminating competition on such a scale is irreconcilable with the very essence 
of the Sherman Act, the preservation of commercial competition in interstate industries.”). 
 144. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68–75 (1936) (voiding agricultural tax as an 
attempted regulation of agriculture reserved to the authority of the states under the Tenth 
Amendment); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11–18 (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 
U.S. 1, 24–26 (1888). 
 145. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (sustaining regulation of purely local 
agriculture). For instance, in United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939), the United States 
successfully challenged collusion between dairies in Illinois and neighboring states setting the 
price of milk shipped to Chicago. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MONOPOLY 435–36 (1966) (describing this enforcement action). Under Addyston Pipe, the 
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naturally from the principles of political economy that informed Gibbons, 
Wabash, and Addyston Pipe. Given California’s monopoly on raisins, new entry 
could not prevent the restrictions from “directly” restraining interstate 
commerce.146 Moreover, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained, the impact 
of the state-imposed Parker restrictions “spilled over” to other states, with 
consumers in such jurisdictions bearing nearly all the harm flowing from 
California’s restraints.147 Thus, such restrictions exemplified a case where a 
state enacted legislation that pursued “its own particular interest[,]”148 and 
where the resulting legislation “affect[ed] the commercial interests of all the 
[s]tates . . . .”149 Thus, despite (overruled) precedents depriving Congress of 
authority to regulate agriculture, these new circumstances established that the 
“essential character” of legislation coercively setting raisin output below the 
competitive level was “[n]ational,” and thus “must . . . belong exclusively to 
the Federal government.”150 Nonetheless, the Parker Court ignored numerous 
precedents (including Addyston Pipe) that seemed to ban such state price and 
output regulation, which restrained interstate commercial activity, and 
rejected the plaintiff’s Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.151 
V. APPLYING THE SHERMAN ACT TO STATE RESTRAINTS IN A POST-1937 
WORLD 
Combined with the Court’s refusal to enforce meaningful limits on the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power, this unshackling resulted in a vast 
increase in the overlap between the power of states and Congress to regulate 
commercial activity.152 This overlap, combined with the Court’s expansive 
reading of the Sherman Act, raised two interpretive questions courts did not 
face before 1937. First, does the Sherman Act preempt unreasonable state 
restraints of interstate commerce, such as state legislation setting minimum 
prices or maximum output, as in Parker? Second, does the Sherman Act 
preempt state bans of otherwise reasonable private conduct that qualifies as 
 
participation of the Illinois defendants was beyond the scope of federal antitrust regulation. See 
supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 146. Cf. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 10–11 (declining to opine on whether ease of entry 
rendered challenged merger to monopoly innocuous). 
 147. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 39 (“More than 90 percent of the monopoly 
overcharge produced by the prorate program (a mechanism for reducing the supply of raisins) 
thus fell on nonresidents of California.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 644–45; Hovenkamp & 
Mackerron, supra note 22, at 769. 
 148. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 231 (1899). 
 149. Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. 148, 152 (1868). 
 150. Id.; see also Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 234. 
 151. The Court also ignored various decisions invalidating state price regulation of products 
exported to other states. See supra note 101 (collecting such cases); see also Meese, supra note 28, 
at 317 n.445 (explaining that decisions Parker invoked in support of its Dormant Commerce 
Clause holding were inapposite). 
 152. See Gardbaum, supra note 140, at 510–32; see also supra notes 42–47 and accompanying 
text (discussing examples of overlapping authority pursuant to Cooley and its progeny). 
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interstate commerce? The conventional answer, that Congress declined to 
impose either form of preemption because of “federalism” and “state 
sovereignty,” is simply incorrect, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained. 
Congress made no such choice. 
Thus, the post-1937 interpretive question for antitrust courts can be 
framed as follows: Given the lack of any conscious decision by Congress 
regarding the treatment of public restraints, should the Sherman Act 
nonetheless preempt such restraints? In my view, the case for such 
preemption is much stronger than the Court (and to a lesser extent, Professor 
Hovenkamp) has admitted.153 As Standard Oil explained, the Sherman Act 
empowers courts to fashion a common law of antitrust in light of evolving 
understandings of the impact of various restraints.154 Even Justice Scalia, 
known for his formal, textual approach to statutory interpretation, has 
assured us that the Sherman Act adopted the common law “along with its 
dynamic potential.”155 As Chief Justice White said in Standard Oil, such 
flexibility ensured that parties could not evade the “public policy” contained 
in the Act by adopting harmful practices unknown at common law or practices 
that, while once deemed benign, are now considered harmful.156 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress meant to exercise all of 
its constitutional power when it passed the Sherman Act, with the result that 
the statute now reaches conduct Congress could not reach in 1890.157 That is 
why a merger between manufacturers, what the Court called an “indirect 
restraint” in 1895, can now give rise to a federal case, even if the merger 
achieves far less than a monopoly.158 Technology and legal institutions have 
changed, empowering firms to employ such transactions to control markets 
and directly restrain interstate commerce. Finally, the Court has told us that 
the Sherman Act is a “charter of freedom,” indeed, “the Magna Carta of free 
enterprise.”159 No doubt focus on economic liberty has sometimes led the 
Court astray, as when the Court found that voluntary private restraints that 
 
 153. So far as I know, no Justice has ever voted to overrule Parker, which itself was unanimous. 
 154. Meese, supra note 119, at 89–92. 
 155. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman 
Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common 
law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 
1890.” (citations omitted)); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 69 (“One of the great myths 
about American antitrust policy is that courts first began to adopt an ‘economic approach’ to 
antitrust problems in the relatively recent past. . . . [However,] [a]ntitrust has always been closely 
tied to prevailing economic doctrine.” (footnote omitted)). 
 156. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1911). 
 157. See supra notes 61 & 137 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz & Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(sustaining FTC’s challenge to transaction that produced firm with less than 35% of the market). 
 159. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) (referring to the Sherman Act as a “charter of 
economic liberty” (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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create wealth abridged the liberty of the parties who entered them and 
defended them vigorously in court.160 Still, even Justices protective of 
economic liberty during the Lochner era recognized that the Sherman Act 
protected private firms and individuals from certain contracts and thus 
protected “the freedom of trade” from private restraints.161 This “super 
statute” implements the nation’s fundamental commitment that “competition 
rule[s] the marts of trade,”162 and it is not repealed lightly, expressly or 
implicitly.163 
State-imposed direct restraints of interstate commerce were unlawful and 
thus unknown in that sense when Congress passed the Sherman Act. They 
also produce the very same harms—sometimes greater harms—than private 
restraints. The Parker restraints reduced output and increased prices and thus 
produced more harm than many unlawful private restraints, some of which 
courts condemn regardless of harm.164 The scheme also restrained the actual 
liberty of the state’s raisin growers, unlike the typical private cartel, as 
membership in the latter is purely voluntary. 
In short, state restraints, backed by the threat of jail, fine, or both, do 
more violence to economic liberty than most, if not all, private restraints. They 
can also produce more economic harm than many private restraints the 
Sherman Act condemns. If the Sherman Act reflects a national policy favoring 
“free competition,” economic liberty and the resulting allocation of resources, 
state restraints that export harm to other states thwart that policy every bit as 
much as, say, an exemption from the Act at the behest of special interests, 
something courts are loathe to find.165 If Congress really did mean the scope 
of the Sherman Act to expand over time to reach restraints that were 
 
 160. Topco, of course, exemplified this sort of error. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust, Regulatory 
Harm and Economic Liberty, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 115, 121–22 (2014). 
 161. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“The purpose of the 
Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which probably would 
unduly interfere with the free exercise of the rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, in 
trade and commerce—in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade.”); Standard Oil, 221 
U.S. at 55–56 (explaining that English common law declined to enforce unreasonable restraints 
in part because of their impact on “the rights of individuals”). 
 162. Times–Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see also William 
N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1231–37 (2001) (discussing 
the Sherman Act’s status as a “super statute” of quasi-constitutional dimensions). 
 163. See Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979) (emphasizing 
that courts construe implicit and explicit exemptions from the Sherman Act narrowly). 
 164. Naked horizontal price fixing, for instance, is unlawful per se regardless of the market 
position of the parties. Moreover, many ties deemed unlawful per se may actually produce net 
economic benefits. See Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the 
Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 61–66 (1997). 
 165. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 
1992) (stating that “courts read [special interest] exceptions to the antitrust laws narrowly, with 
beady eyes and green eyeshades” (citing, e.g., Grp. Life & Health Ins., 440 U.S. at 231; Nat’l 
Broilier Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827–29 (1978))). 
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unknown or beyond its authority in 1890, then surely the Act must preempt 
state restraints, now that legal developments, some external to the Act, make 
such preemption possible.166 That, at least, is what the Roosevelt 
Administration, including Thurman Arnold, thought in 1943.167 
Considerations of federalism do not necessarily point in the other 
direction. The same Court that invokes federalism in support of Parker has 
expanded the Sherman Act to reach conduct that is far more “local” than 
California’s raisin cartel.168 Any coherent “federalism” or “state sovereignty” 
that justifies Parker, ARC America, and Exxon includes more than the license to 
coerce market actors to reduce output or increase prices. Properly 
understood, such federalism also includes the ability not to pass an antitrust 
statute in the first place, or to pass one that allows defendants to assert a 
reasonable price defense, for instance.169 Yet, the same jurisprudence that 
allows states to impose cartels on multi-million dollar industries exporting 
their (diminished) output to other states also bans purely local price fixing by 
private parties with no interstate effect, regardless of the antitrust policy of 
the state in question. Instead of privileging “federalism,” then, decisions such 
as Parker, Exxon, and ARC America privilege “regulation” over liberty and 
efficiency.170 A mere preference for more regulation does not rebut the legal 
case for preemption sketched above. 
There are, of course, arguments militating against such preemption. The 
persuasiveness of these contentions will turn on the reader’s approach to 
reading statutes and reaction to the current scope of the Sherman Act vis-à-
vis purely local conduct. As an initial matter, the Sherman Act penalizes 
“persons” who enter “contracts,” “combinations,” or “conspiracies,” or who 
“monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “conspire to monopolize.”171 
States are not “persons” who can “monopolize,” and a statute authorizing a 
state agency to restrict output is certainly not an “agreement,” even if 
 
 166. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 91, 1214–33 (explaining how change in legal 
presuppositions can justify changed application of an otherwise unchanged provision). 
 167. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 8, at 61–62 (noting Congress 
plainly had the authority “to supersede all state legislation in a field it intends to occupy” and had 
“‘exercised all the power it possessed’” when passing the Sherman Act (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. 
v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1941))); id. at 65 (“A state legislative program eliminating 
competition on such a scale is irreconcilable with the very essence of the Sherman Act, the 
preservation of commercial competition in interstate industries.”); id. at 66 (“The Sherman Act 
may thus be regarded as a [c]ongressional affirmation of the constitutional doctrine that national 
interstate commercial interests are not to be subjected to restrictive state legislation.”). 
 168. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792–93 (1975) (applying Sherman Act to 
price fixing for title searches in one county). 
 169. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 30, 40 (contending that Parker’s respect for federalism 
is selective at best). 
 170. Exxon’s expressed fear that Sherman Act preemption would prevent states from 
imposing unreasonable and wealth-destroying “economic regulation” exemplifies the pro-
regulation bias of the Court’s antitrust federalism jurisprudence. 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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incumbent producers advocate and welcome the measure.172 True, such 
measures can produce the same (or worse) effects as private restraints, but 
then so can sabotage or slander, neither of which are ipso facto antitrust 
violations.173 Congress does not pass “purposes,” but instead enacts statutory 
language—language that signals the means Congress chose to further its 
purpose as well as those means it rejected. Pursuit of such purpose “at all 
costs” can thus thwart, not execute, Congress’s intent.174 
Moreover, given the Sherman Act’s current application to conduct with 
no meaningful interstate impact, antitrust preemption of state interference 
with free competition would result in (federal) judicial supervision of purely 
local regulations. Zoning ordinances, taxicab regulation, occupational 
licensing—all could give rise to antitrust regulation assessing, say, the 
reasonableness of a municipality’s decision, fully authorized by the state, to 
suppress billboards (and thus advertising) so as to maintain a bucolic 
atmosphere and attract tourists.175 Classical liberals like this author might 
applaud the results of such litigation—more economic liberty and more 
wealth. But devotees of an original meaning approach to constitutional 
interpretation—again like this author—would not applaud the 
overexpansion of federal power necessary to achieve them.176 
There is, I believe, a way out of this thicket. In particular, the following 
solution would: (1) void restraints such as those sustained in Parker; (2) avoid 
Sherman Act preemption of state restraints; and (3) minimize the sort of 
federal-state tension that Parker’s proponents invoke as a rationale for 
adhering to the decision. 
First, the Court should restrict the scope of the Sherman Act so as to 
implement the principle that Congress embraced in 1890, applied in light of 
 
 172. See generally Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) 
(emphasizing that section 1 of the Sherman Act only reaches concerted action between otherwise 
independent economic entities). 
 173. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945) (“[The Sherman] Act does not purport 
to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate 
commerce.”). 
 174. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (“[N]o legislation pursues its 
purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the 
achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates 
rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s 
primary objective must be the law.”); see also United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297 (1970) (A 
statute “is not an empty vessel into which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we think better 
suits present-day tastes”). 
 175. Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368 (1991); cf. Bates v. State Bar 
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1977) (relying on Parker to reject Sherman Act challenge to state’s 
ban on lawyer advertising); Hovenkamp & Mackerrron, supra note 22, at 746–47 (cataloguing 
various forms of local economic regulation that have given rise to federal antitrust suits). 
 176. See Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 343 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(decrying expansive reading of the Sherman Act that made “routine business torts” the basis for 
Sherman Act claims thus “destroying a sensible statutory allocation of federal-state responsibility 
and contributing to the trivialization of the federal courts”). 
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modern economic and legal conditions, governing the (limited) scope of the 
commerce power. Thus, the Court should ban only those practices that 
actually restrain interstate commerce and thus impose distinct harm on 
consumers in more than one state.177 Such an approach would limit Sherman 
Act jurisdiction to those instances in which the “object of government 
extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state,” 
with the result that states cannot be trusted to generate optimal rules 
governing such conduct.178 While the Act should reach cartels and 
monopolies that export their products to other states (like the Sugar Trust 
exonerated in E.C. Knight), it should not reach price fixing by lawyers in a 
single county, bans on lawyer advertising in a single state, or the exclusion of 
a single physician from a single department of a single hospital.179 Instead, 
individual states, which internalize the full impact of such restraints will thus, 
in competition with one another, generate optimal rules governing such 
conduct.180 While antitrust purists may not endorse the results that each 
jurisdiction might produce, true federalism requires its proponents to take 
the bitter with the sweet. 
Limiting the scope of the Sherman Act along the lines just suggested 
would, despite the post-1937 unshackling of the states, eliminate most of the 
tension between federal antitrust law, on the one hand, and state and local 
regulation on the other.181 Downsizing the scope of the Act in this manner 
would also deflate much of the “federalism” concerns that drive support for 
 
 177. See Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137 (advocating restriction of Sherman Act jurisdiction to 
those restraints that impact a geographic market that extends beyond a single state); see also 
Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 41 (contending that such a limitation on the scope of the Sherman Act 
would reduce the tension between state regulation and the Sherman Act); cf. McLain v. Real Estate 
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242–46 (1980) (finding Sherman Act jurisdiction when the 
defendants’ activities, and not the restraint itself, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 178. See The Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, supra note 86, at 424; 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228 (1889); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 574 (1886); see also Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137 (resting 
such an approach upon considerations of “competitive federalism”). 
 179. See generally Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137. It should not matter in cases such as Goldfarb 
that individuals who had not yet moved into the state were the nominal purchasers of the cartelized 
services. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 48 (“The cost of attorneys’ services [i.e., the cost of title 
searches in Goldfarb] is simply one component of the price of buying a new house. Real estate and 
attorneys’ time are complementary inputs into housing. If the minimum fee schedules caused the 
price of attorneys’ time to rise, they also caused the price of real estate to fall. The overcharge 
ultimately was paid by the Virginia residents who attempted to sell real estate.”). 
 180. Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 41 (limiting the scope of the Sherman Act to what 
Congress originally contemplated “would obviate most of the need for accommodation and, 
incidentally, produce the sort of inter-jurisdictional competition I discuss in this essay”); Johnsen 
& Yahya, supra note 137, at 458 (advocating reduced scope for Sherman Act jurisdiction so as to 
facilitate competition between states generating statewide antitrust policies). 
 181. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 41 (“The need for accommodation between state and 
federal law arises only because the Sherman Act has grown with the growth of the commerce 
power.” (citations omitted)). 
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Parker. Zoning, lawyer advertising, and regulation of trash collection would all 
reside beyond the scope of section 1, and the title-search lawyers of Fairfax 
County could fix fees until their hearts content so far as the Sherman Act is 
concerned.182 In the same way, North Carolina dentists could induce state 
regulators to exclude non-dentists from the purely local practice of teeth 
whitening.183 Thus, instead of defending the regulation of billboards or 
garbage collection from federal intrusion, opponents of preemption would 
have to defend state raisin cartels and per se bans on reasonable interstate 
resale price maintenance.184 
Second, the Court could, at least for now, reiterate that the Sherman Act 
does not, of its own force, preempt state-imposed restraints. The contrary 
conclusion, while friendly to liberty, might stretch the meaning of “person,” 
“contract,” and “monopolize” too far, ascribing to Congress an important 
choice that body never made. In any event, as we shall see in a moment, there 
is an alternate means of achieving the same result that does not require courts 
to stretch the statute’s original meaning. 
Third and finally, the Court could take up and consider Professor 
Hovenkamp’s suggestion that the Dormant Commerce Clause interdict those 
restraints that impose significant spillovers on consumers in other states.185 To 
do so, of course, the Court would have to reconsider Parker’s less famous 
holding that a pro-rate scheme that visits nearly all of its costs on consumers 
in other states is nonetheless consistent with the Dormant Commerce Clause 
because growers sold to intermediaries and some local consumers purchased 
raisins as well.186 
One hopes that the Court reconsidering Parker’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause holding would begin (and hopefully end) with Gibbons, Wabash, and 
Addyston Pipe. The Gibbons decision opined—to be fair, did not hold—that 
New York’s imposition of monopoly over steam navigation in its home waters 
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause to the extent that the monopoly 
excluded other steamship owners from carrying passengers and goods 
between New York and other states. It did not seem to matter to the Gibbons 
court that the monopoly also excluded New Yorkers from intrastate steamship 
 
 182. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788–93 (1975) (banning agreement on the 
price for title searches by lawyers in Fairfax County, Virginia). 
 183. See generally Johnsen & Yahya, supra note 137. 
 184. Cf. Dr. Miles v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (finding that nationwide 
minimum rpm scheme directly restrained interstate trade and thus fell within jurisdiction of the 
Sherman Act). 
 185. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 646 (opining that the Dormant Commerce Clause can 
police “egregious situations in which the impact of state regulation falls almost entirely on out-
of-state interests”). Unlike Professor Hovenkamp, I would not limit Dormant Commerce Clause 
intervention to “egregious” situations but instead to situations in which spillovers are substantial 
or significant. 
 186. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360, 367 (1943) (emphasizing that California’s 
scheme did not “discriminate” against interstate commerce). 
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travel in New York waters or that some victims of the monopoly were almost 
certainly New Yorkers who wanted to travel to New Jersey almost as badly as 
New Jersey residents wanted to travel to New York. In other words, the Gibbons 
monopoly was entirely neutral and did not “discriminate” in the least against 
citizens from other states. Nonetheless, the Great Chief Justice apparently 
believed that the resulting exclusion of some vessels from interstate 
commerce was unconstitutional, regardless whether Congress acted.187 
Moreover, taken together, Wabash and Addyston Pipe establish that regulations 
of commerce whose effects spill over from one state to another are best left—
in fact, must be left—to the national government or, failing congressional 
action, the market itself.188 Indeed, just five years before Parker, the Court 
conceded “that there is scope for [the Dormant Commerce Clause’s] like 
operation when state legislation nominally of local concern is in point of fact 
aimed at interstate commerce, or by its necessary operation is a means of 
gaining a local benefit by throwing the attendant burdens on those without 
the state.”189 California’s pro-rate scheme did exactly that, conferring benefits 
on California farmers at the expense of citizens in other states, and the Court 
should overrule Parker’s Dormant Commerce Clause holding accordingly.190 
There is an additional reason to abandon Parker’s shelter for state-
imposed cartels. Thus far I have applied the Wabash and Addyston Pipe 
standard for allocating governmental authority from a “microeconomic” 
perspective, asking which jurisdiction—federal or state—is better positioned 
to generate (and decline to generate) rules that lead to an efficient allocation 
of resources. But we now know something the Wabash and Addyston Pipe Courts 
did not know, namely, that restrictions on price and output can have 
(negative) macroeconomic effects as well. In particular, price floors and 
output ceilings thwart the process of natural economic adjustment that can 
moderate downturns and speed economic recovery.191 According to some, 
 
 187. It should also be noted that the monopoly grant excluded New York entrepreneurs as 
well as those from New Jersey and was thus neutral in this sense as well. One could, however, 
argue that the Gibbons monopoly was discriminatory because the New York legislature would not 
have made such an award to a non-New York resident. However, the Court’s assertion that the 
monopoly violated the Dormant Commerce Clause does not seem to turn on the residence of 
the monopoly’s recipient. 
 188. See supra notes 53–56, 72–85, 92–101 and accompanying text. 
 189. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1938) (citations omitted). 
 190. If Congress believes that state-by-state cartelization of such industries is advisable, it can 
affirmatively authorize such cartelization by statute. Indeed, Parker relied in part upon the fact that 
Congress had itself authorized similar programs for various agricultural products. Parker, 317 U.S. 
at 367–68. However, the decision’s Dormant Commerce Clause holding has apparently not been 
limited to instances in which Congress has implicitly approved the challenged state restraint. 
 191. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 271–76 (7th ed. 2010); F.M. SCHERER, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 363–65 (2d ed. 1980); Christina D. 
Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 25 (1993) (“In the conventional textbook 
model a fall in wages and prices raises real balances, lowers interest rates, and thus stimulates 
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inflexible prices can also reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy as an 
anti-recessionary policy instrument.192 Thus, aggressive antitrust policy and 
other policies that assure free competition can do more than ensure an 
efficient allocation of society’s resources and thus maximize wealth. Such 
policies can also help stabilize the macro-economy. No state internalizes the 
full impact of its economic policies upon the state of (national) aggregate 
demand and supply.  
Nothing, it seems, is more “inherently national” than macroeconomic 
stabilization policy.193 The Parker Court wrote in an era in which many 
believed that state-enforced cartelization would bolster, not hamper, 
economic recovery.194 Modern economic science reaches the opposite 
conclusion, teaching that such restraints hamper recovery. Just three years 
after Parker, Congress committed the national government to the promotion 
of “free competitive enterprise” as part of a larger agenda of price stability 
and full employment.195 Both developments bolster the case for overruling 
Parker and its progeny. 
The approach just sketched would largely, but not entirely, replicate the 
institutional framework that Congress believed it was supporting when it 
passed the Sherman Act in 1890. The Sherman Act (and only the Sherman 
Act) would reach those restraints that produce meaningful interstate 
spillovers. States would be free to regulate (or not) restraints of intra-state 
commerce but not entitled to impose direct restraints on interstate 
commerce. The ratio between the federal and state regulatory domains would 
be larger than in 1890, given the changed nature of American industry and 
the background rules (e.g., corporate law) that support it. Still, the division 
of regulatory authority and resulting (modern) dual federalism would 
implement the (immutable) principle of political economy that animated the 
formative era’s dual federalism. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Sherman Act does not 
preempt state-imposed restraints of interstate commerce, even when such 
restraints visit substantial harm on consumers in other states. Like several 
scholars, the Court has invoked considerations of “federalism” and “state 
sovereignty” to justify this narrow reading of the Act. Thus, the Court has 
 
investment. The rise in investment serves to counteract at least some of the fall in demand.”). See 
generally A.C. Pigou, The Classical Stationary State, 53 ECON. J. 343 (1943) (elaborating this argument). 
 192. See Henry C. Simons, Economic Stability and Antitrust Policy, 11 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 343 (1944). 
 193. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (preventing states from coining money, emitting letters 
of credit or making anything other than gold or silver coin legal tender for the payment of debts). 
 194. See Meese, supra note 28, at 312–15. 
 195. See Employment Act of 1946, ch. 33, 60 Stat. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021–1026 (2012) 
(committing national government to “promote free competitive enterprise” and full 
employment, full production, and price stability). 
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imputed to the 1890 Congress a decision to allow individual states to impose 
restraints that do greater harm to the nation’s economic welfare than many 
analogous private restraints that squarely violate the Act.  
As Professor Hovenkamp has shown, any such congressional intent is 
entirely fictitious. In 1890, the Supreme Court enforced a constitutional 
regime of dual federalism, under which state and national regulatory 
authority was for all relevant purposes mutually exclusive. For instance, the 
Court enforced meaningful limits on Congress’s commerce power, leaving 
states with exclusive authority over purely intrastate commerce. At the same 
time, the Court held that the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause prevented 
states from enacting laws that imposed direct restraints on interstate 
commerce. Such dual federalism and the resulting boundaries between state 
and federal power reflected a basic principle of political economy, namely, 
that states should possess exclusive jurisdiction over conduct that did not 
impact other states, while Congress should retain sole authority over that 
conduct which affected more than one state. Thus, the 1890 Congress had no 
reason to consider whether the Sherman Act would ban unreasonable state-
imposed restraints of interstate commerce. Moreover, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented states from imposing unreasonable 
restraints of intrastate commerce.  
The constitutional framework in place in 1890 collapsed in the late 
1930s, creating a regime of overlapping state and federal powers in which 
states are free to impose wealth-destroying restraints of interstate commerce, 
so long as such restraints do not expressly discriminate against interstate 
commerce. These fundamental changes in the constitutional landscape force 
courts to consider whether the Sherman Act preempts state-imposed 
restraints that produce the same economic harm as private restrains that 
violate the Act. This Essay contends that the case for such preemption is 
stronger than many have recognized, given the long-recognized authority of 
courts to alter the scope of the Sherman Act in response to changed 
circumstances. At the same time, the Essay proposes an approach that is less 
radical than Sherman Act preemption of all state-imposed restraints currently 
within Congress’s jurisdiction. Instead, the Essay proposes that the Court 
restrict the scope of the Sherman Act so that the statute reaches only that 
conduct which produces harm in more than one state. Such an approach 
would restore the original federal–state balance where antitrust regulation is 
concerned and eliminate many potential conflicts between the Sherman Act 
and purely local regulation. At the same time, the Court should revitalize 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence so as to invalidate those state-
imposed restraints that impose significant harm on consumers in other states. 
Like the proposed reduction in the scope of the Sherman Act, such 
revitalization will help restore the allocation of regulatory authority extant 
when Congress passed the Sherman Act.  
 
